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Abstract When a stable matching rule is used for a college admission market, ques-
tions on incentives facing agents of both sides of the market naturally emerge. This
note states and proves four important results which fill a gap in the theory of incentives
for the college admission model. Two of them have never been demonstrated but have
been used along the years and are responsible for the success that this theory has had
in explaining empirical economic phenomena.
Keywords Stability · Manipulability · Stable mechanism · Nash equilibrium ·
Equilibrium outcome
JEL Classification C78 · D78
1 Introduction
This note considers stable matching rules defined for a particular college admission
market with strict and responsive preferences. The adoption of a specific rule for some
college admission market induces a strategic game where the players are the colleges
and the students of the given market, the strategies are the preferences they can state
and the payoff function is defined by the given matching rule. Questions on incentives
facing students and colleges naturally emerge.
M. Sotomayor (B)
Department of Economics, Cidade Universitária, Universidade de São Paulo,
Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto 908, 05508-900 São Paulo, SP, Brazil
e-mail: marildas@usp.br
M. Sotomayor
Department of Economics, Brown University, 64 Waterman Street, Providence, RI, USA
123
180 M. Sotomayor
The first important result in this direction is the non-manipulability theorem due
to Dubins and Freedman (1981). These authors proved that: under the student-optimal
stable matching rule, the students of any coalition cannot get preferred mates by fal-
sifying their preferences. (Similar result holds for the colleges when all colleges have
a quota of one).1
In their paper of 1981, Dubins and Freedman also present an important example
where all colleges have a quota of one and a participant from one of the sides of
the market can be better off by misreporting his/her/its preferences under the optimal
stable matching rule for the other side. It turns out that the phenomenon observed in
that example is not accidental. Actually, it holds for every college admission market
in which all colleges have a quota of one (marriage model). This can be immedi-
ately proved from Dubins and Freedman’s theorem plus Theorem 4.6 of Roth and
Sotomayor (1990), but it has never been presented in the literature. Indeed, it is a
corollary of a more general result proved in Sotomayor (1996):Without any restriction
on the quotas of the colleges, if the optimal stable matching rule for the students is
not being used then there will be an incentive for some student to misrepresent his/her
preferences.
The paper of Sotomayor (1996) was published in Portuguese, and perhaps because
of that, the result mentioned above has then been known only by the author. However,
a general manipulability theorem has been used and believed to hold for any college
admission model: If the matching produced by the allocation rule is not the optimal
stable matching for one of the sides of the market, it is always true that some participant
of this side of the market can be better off by misreporting his/her/its preferences.
The non-manipulability theorem and the general manipulability theorem are the
central results of the theory on incentives for the college admission market. They
gave origin to or motivated all important results of the theory of stable matching rules
for that model. A general impossibility theorem for the college admission model,
never stated and never proved in the literature, can be easily derived as a corollary: If
the college admission market has more than one stable matching, then, in the game
induced by any stable matching rule, at least one agent can profitably misrepresent
his/her/its preferences, assuming the others tell the truth.2 This result confirms the
beliefs we have had along the years that the kind of phenomenon observed in Roth’s
example used to prove the Impossibility Theorem for the marriage model (Theorem
4.4 of Roth and Sotomayor 1990) generalizes to every college admission market.
In the present work we first provide the proof and formal statement of the two
general results mentioned above for the college admission model, aiming to fill an
important gap in the literature of this model. Next, we address the equilibrium analy-
sis of the game induced by any stable matching rule. The crucial observation is that,
1 Indeed this result is more general: If a stable matching rule produces the student optimal stable matching
when the students select their true preferences, then the students of any coalition cannot get preferred
mates by falsifying their preferences. This result was proved by Dubins and Freedman (1981) for the col-
lege admission problem with responsive preferences. A shorter proof of this result is given in Gale and
Sotomayor (1985a).
2 A particular case that presupposes that all colleges have quota of one was proved by Roth and Sotomayor
(1990). The case in which the student optimal stable matching rule is used is proved in Gale and Sotomayor
(1985b). The arguments used in the proof of these results do not apply to the college admission model.
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as implied by the general impossibility theorem, if the college admission market has
more than one stable matching, the profile of true preferences is not Nash equilibrium
in the game induced by any stable matching rule. Thus, in every profile of Nash equi-
librium there will be some agents that will misreport their preferences. It is therefore
natural to expect that the stability of the equilibrium outcomes, under the true pref-
erences, be affected when agents behave strategically. In fact, one of the results of
our investigation, which fully characterizes the Nash equilibrium outcomes under any
stable matching rule, asserts that: The Nash equilibrium outcomes under any stable
matching rule are precisely the feasible matchings under the true preferences.3 Hence,
the stable matchings can be produced by Nash equilibrium strategies.
Nevertheless this is not a very illuminating result. These Nash equilibrium strat-
egies are constructed so that students and colleges have to misreport their true pref-
erences and an enormous amount of coordination among the agents is required (see
Proposition 6*, from Roth (1985), in the text).
A sharper result, using a more restrictive notion of Nash equilibrium is given in
Sotomayor (2008). That paper proves that, under any stable matching rule, every stable
matching under the true preferences can also be produced by a profile of Nash equilib-
rium strategies in which only the students misreport their true preferences. Motivated
by this result, we focus on profiles of Nash equilibrium strategies where only one of the
sides plays strategically. Our main finding is that when colleges select their true pref-
erences in equilibrium (observe that this is not a restriction of the domain of strategies
of the colleges), letting to the students the task of misrepresenting their preferences
strategically, the equilibrium outcome is stable under the true preferences, under any
stable matching rule.
In order to prove this result, we first show that it holds when the matching rule
produces, in equilibrium, the college-optimal stable matching for the selected pref-
erences (in particular, when the matching rule is the college-optimal stable matching
rule). Then we demonstrate that colleges, by selecting its true preferences in equi-
librium, can force any stable matching rule to operate as if it was the optimal stable
matching rule for them. Indeed, if the students select their true preferences in equi-
librium (then some colleges must misreport its preferences), they can also obtain the
optimal stable matching for them under the reported preferences and under any stable
matching rule. It turns out that in this case, it is not always true that the outcome
produced by the optimal stable matching rule for the students is stable under the true
preferences when the students behave straightforwardly. In fact, an example presented
here shows that when colleges do not select their sincere strategies, even when the
students do so, the equilibrium outcomes may be unstable under the true preferences,
under any stable matching rule. In this example the college belonging to the pair that
causes the instability has a quota of two, so it acts as if it had two copies. In order
to affect the equilibrium of the outcome, only one of the copies of the college should
deviate from the strategy selected. But this is not possible, because deviations of a
college with a quota greater than one must be the same for all copies.
3 Roth (1985) proved that every feasible matching can be produced by a profile of Nash equilibrium
strategies under any stable matching rule. (See also Theorem 5.18 of Roth and Sotomayor 1990).
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When restricted to the Marriage model, our theorem provides a stronger result than
Theorem 4.16 of Roth and Sotomayor (1990), due to Roth (1984), in the sense that
the conclusion is obtained not only for the man-optimal stable matching rule, but for
any stable matching rule: If, under any stable matching rule for the marriage market,
all men (respectively, women) select their true preferences in equilibrium, then the
resulting outcome is stable under the true preferences. As argued before, the agents of
one of the sides, by selecting his/her true preferences, can compel any stable matching
rule to operate as if it was the optimal stable matching rule for them, so Roth’s theorem
applies.
This note is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we present the theoretical framework.
The formal cooperative model is presented in Sect. 2.1. In Sect. 2.2 we present the
admission mechanism and state some results, already proved in the literature, which
will be needed in Sect. 3. In this section we present and prove the main results. Some
final remarks and related work are presented in Sect. 4.
2 Framework
2.1 The model
The mathematical model for the College admission model, as described in Roth and
Sotomayor (1990), consists of two finite and disjoint sets of participants, which we
may think of as being a set S of students, with m elements and a set C of colleges, with
n elements. For each college c there is a positive integer number q(c) called quota of
c, which represents the number of positions it has to offer.
Each student has preferences over the colleges and each college has preferences
over individual students. We will assume these preferences are complete, transi-
tive and strict, and so they may be represented by ordered lists, with P(c) =
s1, s3, s2, c, s4, . . . denoting that college c prefers s1 rather than s3, that it prefers s3
rather than s2, that it prefers either one of them rather than leaving a position unfilled,
and that all other students are unacceptable, in the sense that it would be prefera-
ble to leave a position unfilled rather than filling it with, say, student s4. Similarly,
P(s) = c1, c2, s, c3, . . . represents the preferences of student s. We write s >P(c) s′
to indicate that college c prefers s to s′ and s ≥P(c) s′ to indicate that college c prefers
s to s′ or s = s′. Similarly, c >P(s) c′ and c ≥P(s) c′ represent preference P(s) of
student s. College c is acceptable to student s under P if c >P(s) s, and student s is
acceptable to college c if s >P(c) c.
We will assume that the preferences of a college over groups of students are respon-
sive to its preferences over individual students. That is, if A is a set of students such
that |A| < q(c), and σ and σ ′ are in S ∪ {c} and are not in A, then college c prefers
A ∪ {σ } to A ∪ {σ ′} if and only if σ >P(c) σ ′. If |A| ≤ q(c) and |B| ≤ q(c), we will
write A >P(c) B to denote that college c prefers A to B and A ≥P(c) B to denote that
college c likes A at least as well as B.
We will use the notation P ′C ≥C PC to indicate that for every college c, P ′(c)
is obtained from P(c) by lowering the position of c in P(c) so that to increase the
number of acceptable students in P ′(c). We say that P ′C is an extension of PC .
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The rules of the market allow that any student and college may mutually agree that
the college will admit the student. That is, under the rules of the market, a college
and a student form a partnership if both agents agree. Also, any college may choose
to keep any of its positions unfilled, and any student may remain unmatched if she
wishes. Roughly speaking, a matching is an allocation of students to colleges that
respects the quotas of the agents. A student who is not matched to any college will
be matched to himself/herself and will be called unmatched; a college that has some
number of unfilled positions will be matched to itself in each of these positions. If μ
is a matching, μ(s) = c denotes that student s is admitted by college c at matching
μ; μ(c) = {s2, s4, c, c}, for example, denotes that college c, with quota q(c) = 4,
admits students s2 and s4 and has two unfilled positions. Then,
Definition 1 A matching μ is feasible if for every pair (s,c), such that μ(s) = c, we
have that s and c are mutually acceptable under P.4
The natural solution concept for this model is that of pairwise-stability.
Definition 2 A matching μ is pairwise-stable (stable, for short) for the market M if
it is feasible for M and there is no student s and college c, not matched to one another
at μ, such that (a) c >P(s) μ(s) and (b) s >P(c) σ , for some σ ∈ μ(c).
A student s and a college c, as in Definition 2, are said to destabilize the matching μ.5
Agents’ preferences over matchings are given by their preferences over their corre-
sponding mates. These preferences need not be strict. Thus, for example, μ ≥P(s) μ′
will denote that μ(s) >P(s) μ′(s) or μ(s) = μ′(s); and μ ≥P(c) μ′ will denote that
μ(c) ≥P(c) μ′(c).
From the above definition, stable matchings can be identified using only the agents’
preferences over individuals. In order to compare two stable matchings, only the
agents’ preferences over individuals are required (see Proposition 2 of Roth and So-
tomayor 1989). Thus, for our purposes, we only need to consider the colleges’ prefer-
ences over individual students. The profile of individual preferences will be denoted
by P . We will be interested in markets that result when the profile of preferences
P is changed but the sets of agents and quotas of the colleges remain unchanged.
Then, denoting by qC the array of quotas of the colleges, the market is given by
M(P) = (S, C, P, qC ).
Definition 3 For a given market M(P) = (S, C, P, qC ), the stable matching μS(P)
is called the student-optimal stable matching if μS(P)(s) ≥P(s) μ(s) for every stu-
dent s and for every stable matching μ. The college-optimal stable matching µC(P),
is analogously defined.
4 If the colleges interacted with the students in block, then Definition 1 should require individual rationality
instead of mutual acceptance. In any case, under stable matchings, if two players form a partnership then
they are mutually acceptable. Clearly, feasibility implies individual rationality, but the converse is not true.
5 For an abuse of language it is used, sometimes, the terminology “(s, c) blocks μ”, which is already
established in game theory to mean that this coalition can improve upon.
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2.2 The admission game and some preliminaries
Given the market M(P) = (S, C, P, qC ), consider that each student s ∈ S may
replace his/her true preference list, P(s), by any list of preference Q(s) and any col-
lege c may replace its true preference list, P(c), by any list of preference Q(c). Let
Q denote the profile of such lists of preference. Once Q is selected, S, C, Q and qC
are used as “input” for some algorithm that yields a stable matching for the market
M(Q) = (S, C, Q, qC }), as a final “output”. This procedure is described by a func-
tion f that we call stable matching rule. For each profile of preferences Q, f (Q) is
the stable matching for M(Q), which is selected by f . We will denote by S(Q) the
set of stable matchings with respect to Q.
Two special stable matching rules are the student-optimal stable matching rule and
the college-optimal stable matching rule. Under the first one (respectively second one)
the participants are assigned in accordance with the student-optimal (respectively col-
lege-optimal) stable matching for M(Q). If Q is a profile of preferences, we denote
by μS(Q) the student-optimal stable matching for M(Q) and by μC (Q) the college-
optimal stable matching for M(Q).
The adoption of a stable matching rule f for a given market M(P) = (S, C, P, qC )
induces a strategic game where the set of players is the set of agents S ∪ C ; a strat-
egy of student s is any list of preferences Q(s); a strategy of college c is any list of
preferences Q(c); the outcome function is determined by f and the true preferences
of the players, called sincere strategies, are given by P . We refer to this game as the
college admission game induced by f .
We will write Q−x to indicate the restriction of Q to [S ∪ C] − {x}.
The adequate concept of equilibrium is provided by that of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 4 Let f be some stable matching rule for M(P). The profile of strategies
Q is a Nash equilibrium of the college admission game induced by f if for every
student s, f (Q) ≥P(s) f (Q′(s), Q−s) for every strategy Q’(s) of student s, and for
every college c, f (Q) ≥P(c) f (Q′(c), Q−c) for every strategy Q’(c) of college c.
The existence of Nash equilibria was proved in Roth (1985) (Proposition 6* below).
Remark 1 If Q is Nash equilibrium of the college admission game induced by some
stable matching rule f , then f (Q) is individually rational under the true preferences.
In fact, if x >P(x) f (Q)(x) for some agent x , then x can be better off by choosing
Q′(x) = {x}, because then he/she/it will be unmatched at any stable matching for
M(Q′(x), Q−x ). But this contradicts the assumption that Q is Nash equilibrium of
the given game. unionsq
The following propositions will be needed for the proofs of our results.
Proposition 1* (a) (Gale and Sotomayor 1983, 1985a) Consider the College admis-
sion market with strict preferences. Then, every student matched under some stable
matching is matched under every stable matching; every college fills the same fraction
of its quota at every stable matching.
(b) (Roth 1986) Consider the College admission market with strict preferences.
Then, if a college does not fill its quota at some stable matching, it is matched to the
same set of students at every stable matching.
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Proposition 2* (Roth and Sotomayor 1989) Let μ and μ′ be stable matchings for
M(P) = (S, C, P, qC ). If μ(c) >P(c) μ′(c) for some college c, then s >P(c) s′ for
all s in μ(c) and s’ in μ′(c)-μ(c).
Proposition 3* (Sotomayor 1996) Let f be a stable matching rule for the market
M(P) = (S, C, P, qC ). If f (P) 	= μS(P) then there will be an incentive for some
student to misrepresent its preferences. This student is any s such that f (P)(s) 	=
μS(P)(s).
Proposition 4* (Gale and Sotomayor 1983, 1985a) Suppose S′ ⊆ S and consider the
markets (S, C, P, qC ) and (S′, C, P ′, qC ), where P’ agrees with P on S′ ∪ C. Then,
for every college c,
μS(P)(c) ≥P(c) μS(P ′)(c) and μC (P)(c) ≥P(c) μC (P ′)(c).
Remark 2 It follows from the proof of Proposition 4* that for all s ∈ μS(P)(c)
(respectively s ∈ μC (P)(c)), there is some s′ ∈ μS(P ′)(c) (respectively s′ ∈
μC (P ′)(c)) such that s ≥P(c) s′. unionsq
Proposition 5* (Gale and Sotomayor 1983, 1985a) Consider the markets (S, C,
P, qC ) and (S, C, P ′, qC ) where P ′C is an extension of PC . Then, for every student s,
μS(P ′)(s) ≥P(s) μS(P)(s) and μC (P ′)(s) ≥P(s) μC (P)(s).
Proposition 6* (Roth 1985) Let μ be any feasible matching for (S, C, P, qC ). Sup-
pose every student s chooses the strategy of listing μ(s) as the only acceptable mate
and every college c chooses the strategy of listing μ(c) as the only acceptable mates.
This is Nash equilibrium of the college admission game induced by any stable matching
rule and μ is the equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 7* (Sotomayor 2008) Let μ be a stable matching for the market M(P) =
(S, C, P, qC }). Suppose each college c chooses its true preference P(c) and each stu-
dent s ∈ μ(C) chooses the strategy Q(s) of listing only μ(s) as the only acceptable col-
lege; Q(s)=s in case s is unmatched at μ. The resulting profile of strategies, (QS, PC ),
is Nash equilibrium of the college admission game induced by any stable matching
rule and μ is the equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, S(QS, PC ) = {μ}.
3 Main results
This section is devoted to prove the results stated and discussed in Sect. 1. Our first
theorem complements Proposition 3*. Its proof needs Propositions 1* and 2*, which
concerns the comparison of two groups of students matched to a college under stable
matchings.
Theorem 1 (General manipulability Theorem) Let f be a stable matching rule for the
market M(P) = (S, C, P, qC ). Let X ∈ {S, C}. If f(P) is not the X-optimal stable
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matching of M(P), then some agent of X can profitably misrepresent his/her/its pref-
erences assuming the others report their true preferences. This agent is any x ∈ X
such that f (P)(x) 	= μX (P)(x).
Proof It is enough to prove for X = C , since the other case is given by Proposi-
tion 3*. Then suppose that when all agents state their true preferences, the match-
ing rule yields the stable matching f (P) 	= μC (P). Let c be any college such that
μC (P)(c) >P(c) f (P)(c). Proposition 1*b then implies that c fills its entire quota
under both matchings. Now let c misrepresent its preferences by removing from its
true preference list all students who are ranked below its least preferred student in
μC (P)(c). Call Q(c) this new list of preferences and set Q ≡ (Q(c), P−c).
Clearly, the matching μC (P) will still be stable for M(Q) = (S, C, Q, qC ). It then
follows from Proposition 1*a that c will fill its quota under f (Q). This fact and the
construction of Q(c) imply that f (Q) will be stable for M(P). By the optimality
of μC (P) in M(P) we obtain that μC (P)(c) ≥P(c) f (Q)(c) and so the construc-
tion of Q gives μC (P)(c) ≥Q(c) f (Q)(c). We claim that μC (P)(c) = f (Q)(c). In
fact, otherwise, since μC (P)(c) and f (Q)(c) have the same number of students by
Proposition 1*a, there will be some student s in f (Q)(c) who is not in μC (P)(c).
Proposition 2* then will imply that c prefers its least preferred student in μC (P)(c) to
s, which is not possible by construction of Q(c). Then μC (P)(c) = f (Q)(c). Hence,
c prefers f (Q)(c) to f (P)(c) under its true preferences P, and we have completed
the proof. unionsq
Theorem 2 is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 (General Impossibility Theorem) Let f be a stable matching rule for the
market M(P) = (S, C, P, qC ). Suppose there is more than one stable matching in
M(P). Then at least one agent can profitably misrepresent his/her/its preferences,
assuming the others tell the truth.
Proof It is immediate from Theorem 1. unionsq
Theorem 2 implies that the profile of sincere strategies is not Nash equilibrium
in the game induced by any stable matching rule for a market with more than one
stable matching. Proposition 6* implies that any feasible matching for M is a Nash
equilibrium outcome of any admission game induced by a stable matching rule for M .
Theorem 3 provides the converse of this result: a Nash equilibrium outcome is always
feasible in such a game. That is,
Theorem 3 (Characterization of the Nash equilibrium outcomes) Let f be a stable
matching rule for M(P) = (S, C, P, qC ). The Nash equilibrium outcomes of the col-
lege admission game induced by f are precisely the feasible matchings under the true
preferences P.
Proof Let Q be a Nash equilibrium of the college admission game induced by f . Sup-
pose by way of contradiction that there are some c and some s∗ ∈ f (Q)(c) that are
not mutually acceptable under P . Remark 1 implies that f (Q) is individually rational
under P, so s∗ must be unacceptable to c under P . Furthermore, the individual ratio-
nality of f (Q) implies that s∗ is not the only student in f (Q)(c) and so f (Q)(c)−{s∗}
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has, at least, one student. Let Q′(c) be such that the only acceptable students for c are
those in f (Q)(c)−{s∗} and set Q′ ≡ (Q′(c), Q−c). We are going to show that c gets
all students in f (Q)(c)-{s∗} under f (Q′). In fact, let Q∗(c) be obtained by adding
s∗ at the end of the list of acceptable students of Q′(c). Set Q∗ = (Q∗(c), Q−c).
Clearly, f (Q) is stable under Q∗. By Proposition 1*a, f (Q)(c) and μS(Q∗)(c) have
the same number of students. The construction of Q∗ then implies that f (Q)(c) and
μS(Q∗)(c) have the same students. On the other hand, we have that Q∗C ≥C Q′C , so
Proposition 5* implies that μS(Q∗)(s) ≥Q(s) μS(Q′)(s) for all s ∈ S. In particular,
c ≥Q(s) μS(Q′)(s) ≥Q(s) f (Q′)(s) for every s ∈ μS(Q∗)(c) = f (Q)(c). Thus, if
there is some s ∈ f (Q)(c) − {s∗} who is not matched to c under f (Q′), the fact that
c >Q(s) f (Q′)(s) implies that (s, c) destabilizes f (Q′) under Q′, which is a contra-
diction. Therefore, f (Q′)(c) = f (Q)(c)−{s∗}. The responsiveness of the preferences
of the colleges implies that f (Q′)(c) >c f (Q)(c), which contradicts the assumption
that Q is a Nash equilibrium. Hence for every c and for every s ∈ f (Q)(c), s and c
are mutually acceptable under the true preferences P .
The other assertion follows from Proposition 6*. unionsq
Our next theorem provides a sufficient condition on college’s strategies for the
obtainment of the stability of Nash equilibrium outcomes under the true preferences.
For its proof we need Propositions 1 and 2 below. Proposition 1 extends Theorem 1 of
Sotomayor (2008) to the case where colleges are allowed to behave strategically but
play their sincere strategies at equilibrium.6
Proposition 1 Consider the college admission market (S, C, P, qC ). Let Q =
(QS, PC ) be a preference profile. Let f be a stable matching rule for (S, C, P, qC )
such that f (Q) = μC (Q). If Q is a Nash equilibrium of the college admission game
induced by f, then μC (Q) is stable for the market M(P).
Proof Suppose by way of contradiction that μC (Q) is not stable under P . Remark 1
implies that μC (Q) is individually rational under the true preferences, so no student is
matched to an unacceptable college under P; the stability of μC (Q) under (QS, PC )
implies that every student matched to a college is acceptable to it under P . Then,
μC (Q) is feasible under P and the instability of μC (Q) is caused by a pair (s, c) such
that
c >P(s) μC (Q)(s) and s >P(c) σ, for some σ ∈ μC (Q)(c) (σ may be c). (1)
We will show that Q is not a Nash equilibrium of the college admission game induced
by f, which is a contradiction. To see this, let s deviate from Q(s) by listing only c on
her list of acceptable colleges. Let Q′ differ from Q only in the new list of s. If s does
not get c, then she is unmatched at f (Q′). By Proposition 1*a, s is also unmatched at
μC (Q′). In this case, the stability of μC (Q′) in M(Q′) implies that college c fills its
quota under μC (Q′) and
6 It is remarked in Sotomayor (2008) that several of its results would hold under the assumption that the
colleges have strategic behavior. There, it must be understood that it is also assumed that the colleges choose
their sincere strategy at equilibrium.
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s′ >P(c) s,∀s′ ∈ μC (Q′)(c). (2)
By (1), (2) and the transitivity of the preferences,
s′ >P(c) σ, ∀s′ ∈ μC (Q′)(c). (3)
Now, observe that the restriction of matching μC (Q′) to the market M∗ = (S −
{s}, C, Q−s, qC ) is stable for this market. Let μ∗C denote the college-optimal stable
matching for M∗. The optimality of μ∗C implies
μ∗C (c) ≥P(c) μC (Q′)(c). (4)
Since c fills its quota at μC (Q′), Proposition 1*a implies that
c fills its quota at μ∗C . (5)
On the other hand, Proposition 4* applied to M∗ and M(Q′) implies that μ∗C (c) ≤P(c)
μC (Q′)(c), so (4) gives μ∗C (c) = μC (Q′)(c). Therefore, using (3),
s′ >P(c) σ, ∀s′ ∈ μ∗C (c). (6)
Proposition 4* applied to M∗ and M(Q) implies that μC (Q)(c) ≥P(c) μ∗C (c), and
Remark 2 adds that college c weakly prefers σ to some of its mates in μ∗C (c). By (5),
all c′s mates at μ∗C are students, so c weakly prefers σ to some student in μ∗C (c), which
contradicts (6). Hence f (Q′)(s) = c, so Q is not a Nash equilibrium of the college
admission game induced by f , as we wanted to show. unionsq
Consequently, under the college-optimal stable matching rule, if the colleges select
their true preferences in equilibrium, the resulting outcome is stable under the
true preferences.
For the proof of Proposition 2 we need Lemma 1 below. A similar version of
this lemma was proved by the first time in Sotomayor (1998). It is also presented in
Sotomayor (2008) and Ma (2002). For the sake of completeness we give a short, direct
and self-contained proof of it.
For an abuse of notation we will write |μ(x)| to mean the number of mates, other
than x , that are matched to x at μ.
Lemma 1 Let Q be a Nash equilibrium of the college admission game induced by the
stable matching rule f. Then, f (Q)(x) ≥P(x) μ(x) for every x ∈ S ∪ C and every μ
in S(Q).
Proof Suppose by way of contradiction that μ(x) >P(x) f (Q)(x) for some x ∈
S ∪ C and some μ in S(Q). The individual rationality of f (Q) under the true pref-
erences implies that x is not unmatched under μ (recall Remark 1). Let Q′(x) =
μ(x) and Q′−x = Q−x . Clearly, μ is stable for M(Q′). By Proposition 1*a, 0 <
|μ(x)| = |μ′(x)| for every stable matching μ′ under Q′, so x gets μ(x) under f (Q′),
so f (Q′)(x) >P(x) f (Q)(x), and so Q cannot be a Nash equilibrium of the game
induced by f , which is a contradiction. unionsq
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Given the list of true preferences P(x), we will say that P ′(x) is a truncation of
P(x) at some agent v (v may be x) if P ′(x) preserves the ordering given by P(x) but
ranks as unacceptable all agents that are ranked below v. We will say that P ′(x) is
a truncation of P(x) if it is a truncation of P(x) at some agent v. Clearly the true
preference P(x) is a truncation of itself.
Proposition 2 asserts that if Q is a Nash equilibrium profile of strategies where
the agents of one of the sides of the market select truncations of the true preferences
(these truncations might be their true preferences) then the equilibrium outcome is the
optimal stable matching for this side with respect to Q. A corollary of this result is
Theorem 8 of Ma (2002) which asserts that if in a given Nash equilibrium profile Q,
both sides of the market select truncations of their true preferences, the set of stable
matchings with respect to Q is a singleton.
Proposition 2 Consider the college admission market (S, C, P, qC ). Let Q =
(QS, QC ) be a Nash equilibrium of the college admission game induced by the stable
matching rule f. Let X ∈ {S, C}. If Q X is a profile of truncations of the true preferences
then f (Q) = μX (Q).
Proof Since Q is a Nash equilibrium it follows that Lemma 1 applies, so f (Q)(x)
≥P(x) μ(x) for every μ in S(Q) and every x in X . By construction of Q X it follows
that f (Q)(x) ≥Q(x) μ(x) for every μ in S(Q), so f (Q) = μX (Q). unionsq
Proposition 7* implies that, in the college admission game induced by any stable
matching rule, the agents can reach any stable matching under the true preferences
by Nash equilibrium strategies in which the colleges play their sincere strategies.
Theorem 4 gives a sort of converse.
Theorem 4 (Stability of the equilibrium outcomes) Consider the college admission
market (S, C, P, qC ). Let Q = (QS, PC ) be a preference profile. Suppose Q is a Nash
equilibrium of the college admission game induced by some stable matching rule f.
Then f(Q) is stable under the true preferences P.
Proof Proposition 2 implies that f (Q) = μC (Q). The result follows from Proposi-
tion 1. unionsq
Roth (1984) proved, for the Marriage market, that if Q is a Nash equilibrium for
the matching game induced by the men-optimal stable matching rule where each man
chooses his dominant strategy and states his true preferences, then the corresponding
equilibrium outcome is stable under the true preferences. An immediate consequence
of Theorem 4 is that we can relax the assumption that the stable matching rule is given
by the men-optimal stable matching rule in Roth’s result and still get the stability
of the equilibrium outcomes. In this case, the equilibrium outcome corresponding to
Q will be the men-optimal stable matching with respect to Q, as a consequence of
Proposition 2. Due to the symmetry of the Marriage model, Proposition 2 also applies
when the women select their true preferences. In this case the equilibrium outcome
will be the woman-optimal stable matching with respect to Q.
Hence, we have proved the following result which has Roth’s theorem as a corol-
lary. We will denote a Marriage market by (M,W,P), where M and W are the sets of
men and women, respectively.
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Corollary 1 (Stability of the equilibrium outcomes for the Marriage market) Con-
sider the Marriage market (M,W,P). Let Q = (QM , QW ) be a Nash equilibrium of the
matching game induced by the stable matching rule f. If Q X = PX , for X ∈ {M, W },
then f(Q) is stable under P. Furthermore f (Q) = μX (Q).
Corollary 1 does not generalize to the College admission model. If the colleges do
not play their true preferences, we cannot guarantee that the strategy behavior of the
agents will lead to equilibrium outcomes that are stable under the true preferences,
even if the students select their sincere strategy. See the following example.
Example 7(Q = (PS, QC ) is a Nash equilibrium but f (Q) is unstable under the true
preferences) Consider the college admission market where S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, C =
{c1, c2, c3}, q(c1) = 2, q(c2) = q(c3) = 1 and the true preferences are
P(s1) = c3, c1, c2 P(c1) = s1, s2, s3, s4
P(s2) = c2, c1, c3 P(c2) = s1, s2, s3, s4
P(s3) = c1, c3, c2 P(c3) = s3, s1, s2, s4
P(s4) = c1, c2, c3
Consider the profile of strategies Q = (PS, QC ) where Q(c1) = s1, s4 and Q(c2) =
P(c2) and Q(c3) = P(c3). The set of stable matchings with respect to Q contains a
unique matching given by: μ(c1) = {s1, s4}, μ(c2) = s2, μ(c3) = s3.
It is easy to see that Q is a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by any stable
matching rule f . In fact, the students are playing their dominant strategies, so they
cannot profitably deviate from Q; c3 is matched to its first choice; if c2 deviates he
will not get s1, because any matching that matches c2 to s1 will be destabilized by
(s1, c1), so it will not be yielded by f ; if c1 deviates he will not be better off because
any matching that matches c1 to {s1, s2}, or to {s1, s3}, or to {s2, s3}, will be destabi-
lized by (s2, c2) or (s1, c3), so it will not be yielded by f . However, μ is not stable
under the true preferences. It is destabilized by (s3, c1).
Observe that there is a unique stable matching in market M(P), given by μ(c1) =
{s3, s4}, μ(c2) = s2, μ(c3) = s1. Because of this, telling the truth is a dominant
strategy for every student under any stable matching rule (Dubins and Freedman
1981). unionsq
The instability of the equilibrium outcome observed in the example above is due
to the fact that college c1 has a quota greater than one. In the related marriage market,
c1 has two copies, say, c11 and c12, which are matched to s1 and s4, respectively,
under Q. This matching is destabilized by (s3, c12). The argument used in the proof
of Proposition 1 does not apply in this case. It requires that c12 deviates by stating only
s3 in its list of acceptable partners and the other agents, including c11, do not change
their strategies. But this is not possible because both copies of c1 must have the same
preferences. If c1 deviates by listing Q′(c1) = {s1, s3}, then one of its copies gets s3
but the other one looses s1, so c1 cannot be better off by deviating.
7 This example was presented by Roth (1985) to prove that the college-optimal stable matching need not
be weakly Pareto optimal for the colleges.
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4 Concluding remarks and related work
The success that the theory of incentives for the college admission model has had in
explaining empirical economic phenomena is due to the following results:
(1) Non-manipulability Theorem. Under the student-optimal stable matching rule
for any given college admission market, no coalition of students can improve the
outcome for all of its members by falsifying preferences.
(2) General Manipulability Theorem. (a) If a stable matching rule for a given
college admission model does not produce the student-optimal stable matching
when all agents report their true preferences, then there is some student who
can profitably misrepresent his/her preferences; (b) if the stable matching rule
does not produce the college-optimal stable matching when all agents select their
true preferences, then there is some college which can profitably misrepresent
its preferences.
(3) General impossibility Theorem. Under any stable matching rule for a given
college admission market, in which there is more than one stable matching, at
least one agent can profitably misrepresent his/her/its preferences, assuming the
others tell the truth.
(1) is complemented by an example due to Roth (1985), in which some college
admission market is considered where a college with a quota of two can be better off
by misreporting its preferences under any stable matching rule. (2) implies (3). (3)
implies that the profile of true preferences is not a Nash equilibrium under any stable
matching rule. This has motivated the search for Nash equilibrium strategies and has
raised questions concerning the stability of the equilibrium outcomes. (1) is due to
Dubins and Freedman (1981) and (2a) was proved in Sotomayor (1996). The present
work proved (2b) and (3), characterized the Nash equilibrium outcomes and gave a
sufficient condition on the preferences of the colleges for the stability of the equi-
librium outcomes under the true preferences. Our theorem proves that, unlike related
results presented in other papers (see, for example, Ma 2002; Sotomayor 1996, 2008),
it is not necessary to refine the Nash equilibrium concept in order to recover stability.
Instead, it is enough that colleges are allowed to behave strategically but select, at
equilibrium, their sincere strategies.
Several authors have dealt with allocation mechanisms in discrete two-sided match-
ing markets aiming to implement stable matchings via some strategic equilibrium
concept or to analyze the manipulation games induced by such mechanisms. Alcalde
(1996), for instance, studied the possibility of implementing stable matchings for the
marriage model via two types of mechanisms. One of them implements in undom-
inated Nash equilibria the set of all stable matchings; the other one implements the
optimal stable matching for one of the sides of the market via dominance solvabil-
ity. A two-stage and non-revealed preference matching mechanism was considered
in Sotomayor (2003) for the same model. It was proved there that the core can be
implemented via Nash equilibria. Still, for that model, Sönmez (1997a) considered
the preference revelation games induced by Pareto efficient and individually rational
solutions. The equilibrium analysis assume some refinement of the Nash equilibrium
introduced by Kalai et al. (1979), which allows deviations by a set of permissible
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coalitions defined a priori. That paper shows that the set of equilibrium outcomes
equals a variant of the core that allows blocking by only permissible coalitions.
Sotomayor (2001) analyzed another two-stage and non-revealed preference match-
ing mechanism under the context of a discrete many-to-many matching market. That
paper proves the non-emptiness of the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria and
characterizes the corresponding set of equilibrium outcomes as the set of pairwise-
stable matchings. However, the core is not always reached. Nevertheless, if an agent
compares two sets of potential partners by paying most attention to the quality of their
worst members (maximin property) then the equilibrium outcomes are stable.8 On the
other hand, strong equilibria may not exist.
For the college admission model with responsive preferences, Sönmez (1997b)
proved that there is no matching rule that is stable and non-manipulable when col-
leges underreport their capacities. Additional results to the capacity-reporting game
were provided by Konishi and Unver (2006), including the non-existence and condi-
tions to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria. Kojima and Pathak (2009) analyzed
the scope for manipulation in that model under the student-optimal stable mechanism
when the number of participants is large.
For the school choice model we can cite Haeringer and Klijn (2009), who assumed
that students can only declare up to a fixed number of schools to be acceptable and
studied the preference revelation games induced by the Top trading cycles mechanism
and the student-optimal stable mechanism, by focusing on stability and efficiency of
the Nash equilibrium outcomes. They identified necessary and sufficient conditions
on the priorities to guarantee stability or efficiency of either of the two mechanisms.
The theory of incentives for the college admission model with substitutable pref-
erences has been very little explored in the literature. As far as I know, the only result
in this direction is due to Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), who developed a matching
model with contracts which incorporates the many-to-one matching model of Kelso
and Crawford (1982) where colleges have substitutable preferences. For the student
optimal stable mechanism, these authors showed that, under some additional condi-
tion on the preferences of the colleges, it is a dominant strategy for students to reveal
truthfully their preferences over contracts.
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